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  I. Introduction
The workplace has become much more than a source of income for most people.
Employers administer pension plans, life insurance and health insurance for many
workers. As many as ninety percent of privately insured Americans receive their primary
health insurance through the workplace [EBRI, 1996]. Similarly,  in Canada, more than
two-thirds of the population receives supplemental health insurance through an employer
(author’s calculations). There are several reasons why the health insurance market is
primarily administered through the workplace:  large groups of employees may enjoy
lower premiums because of the pooling advantages offered by groups. Administration of
plans and informational asymmetries may be reduced by allowing employers to negotiate
and interpret offers from insurance companies. Finally, governments in both countries
subsidize health insurance provided through an employer by exempting the employer’s
contribution towards the employee’s health insurance from the employee’s taxable
income. Previous literature has shown that subsidizing health insurance through the tax
system by exempting employer contributions from income tax increases the quantity of
health insurance demanded [Pauly, 1986, Stabile, 1999].
This paper investigates the role of tax subsidies in linking the health insurance
market to the employment relationship. It investigates how these subsidies influence
whether health insurance coverage is offered in different sized firms and whether it is
offered through an employer versus the private individual market. The paper presents a2
simple model of the decision to purchase health insurance by workers across different
size firms and uses variation in tax subsidies across Canadian provinces and American
states to test whether the tax-subsidies to employer-provided health insurance affect these
decisions. In particular, it examines whether provinces and states which offer greater
subsidies to employer-provided insurance have more small firms offering insurance than
provinces or states which offer smaller subsidies. It investigates how levels of private
health insurance, purchased outside the employment relationship, are affected by the tax
subsidies. Using these estimates it calculates how the removal of the tax subsidies would
alter the distribution of health insurance benefits across the workforce as well as in the
private market.
  II. How Do Tax-Subsidies Alter the Provision of Health Insurance in
the Market?
Providing health insurance through employers as part of a compensation package
instead of through individual markets for health insurance has several advantages for
employees. Firstly, providing health insurance to a firm instead of an individual may be
more attractive to an insurance company because they can pool risk across the firm. This
may result in lower premiums for individuals who would otherwise be higher risks.
Secondly, group insurance may lower the administrative costs of providing insurance by
using payroll systems to keep track of individual contributions [Gruber and Poterba,
1996]. Thirdly, exempting employer contributions from the employee’s income tax
significantly subsidizes the cost of an insurance package.
The first two reasons outlined above suggest that larger firms should be able to
offer the most attractive health insurance plans. Administrative costs generally increase at3
a decreasing rate and hence the employee’s share of these costs decreases with the
number of employees. Further, more employees allow for greater risk pooling, lowering
the impact of individuals who consume large amounts of health care on the average
employee’s premium. The data suggest that this is indeed the case. In Canada, in firms
with less than twenty employees, only 24% of workers held supplemental health
insurance benefits (health or dental). Among the largest firms, with over five hundred
employees, 79% of workers held supplemental health insurance benefits (Table 1). In the
United States, in firms with ten or fewer employees 30% of workers held health
insurance benefits, while among the largest firms, with over one thousand employees,
72% of workers held health insurance benefits (Table 2).
On the other hand, the third advantage of employer-provided insurance, the tax
subsidies, should not favor larger firms, but should favor employer based insurance over
non-employer based insurance. The tax exemption for health insurance premiums is only
available for employer based packages. In this case, the subsidy available to the worker is
determined by his/her marginal tax rate and not by the firm’s size. In the absence of
government subsidies we would expect to see health insurance benefits concentrated in
larger firms versus smaller firms and individual markets for reasons one and two above.
However, in the presence of government subsidies, small firms now also have an
incentive to offer health insurance benefits to their employees. By providing health
insurance tax-free, even the smallest firms can offer health insurance at highly subsidized
costs.  Since many large firms would be likely to offer health insurance even in the
absence of a subsidy, we might expect that the measured marginal effect of government
subsidies on the decision to offer health insurance be larger in small firms.    4
More formally, an individual decision to purchase insurance can be represented as
follows: Purchase Health insurance if
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where v() ￿  is the individual’s indirect utility function, w is the individual’s wage, r is the
probability of getting sick, M is the cost of illness if sick, and t  is the individual’s
average tax rate. Assume that individuals all face the same cost of insurance, c, whether
insurance is purchased through an employer or purchased privately, but the
administrative or loading costs of insurance, x, are dependent on the number of
individuals in the group purchasing the policy, N. On the private market, N=1. Assume
further that the utility function is well behaved.  In the absence of any tax policy
regarding health insurance, an individual will purchase insurance if the indirect utility
from purchasing insurance is greater than the indirect utility from not purchasing
insurance.
Suppose that the size of the firm only affects an individual’s decision to purchase
insurance through N. Since the cost of insurance is lower in large groups, an individual is
more likely to purchase insurance if they are in a large firm than if they are in a smaller
firm. Similarly, individuals are more likely to purchase insurance through their employer
than on the private market. Suppose that initially for an individual, i:
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Then we would expect this individual to buy insurance through his/her employer
regardless of whether he or she is in a large or small firm.5







 as long as c<w(1-t) +x/N
2,  the larger the firm, the more advantageous it
is to purchase health insurance through the employment relationship.  The data presented
in tables 1 and 2 support this hypothesis. Levels of employer based health insurance rise
dramatically with the size of the firm in both countries.
Alternatively, suppose that for individual, i:
(3)  
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Then this individual will decide to purchase insurance if he works in a large firm and not
to purchase insurance if he works in a small firm
1.
If we now allow the cost of employer contributions to health insurance to be tax
deductible, the individual will purchase insurance if:
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where a is the share of the premium paid by the employer.
For individual i the effects of subsidizing insurance depends on whether he is
initially represented by equation (2) or equation (3). If, as in equation (2), this individual
had already chosen to purchase insurance in order to maximize his indirect utility,
regardless of the size of the firm he is employed in, then the presence of the tax subsidies
will not influence the marginal decision to purchase any insurance for this individual. It
may; however, lead him to purchase more insurance than he otherwise would since he
now can receive this insurance tax-free.6
On the other hand if the individual is initially represented by equation (3), such
that he will purchase insurance if employed at a large firm but not if he is employed at a
small firm, then we might expect the tax subsidy to influence the marginal decision to
purchase any insurance. By subsidizing insurance through the tax system it may be the
case that the indirect utility from purchasing insurance in small firms is now greater than
not purchasing insurance. That is, in the presence of tax subsidies equation (3) becomes
(assuming a=1):
(3’)
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and the individual will now choose to purchase insurance.
If the world is made up of individuals whose decision to purchase health
insurance can be represented by equation (2), then we would expect that subsidizing
insurance may lead individuals who already have health insurance to purchase more
health insurance tax free, but not to a large increase on the margin in the number of
individuals deciding to purchase any health insurance. Also, we would expect that while
large employers would be likely to offer insurance at savings over the private market,
workers in smaller firms may choose to purchase insurance on the private (non-employer
based) market. On the other hand, if many individuals can be represented by equation (3)
then by subsidizing health insurance we would expect that individuals who are employed
in smaller firms will now decide to purchase health insurance through the workplace and
                                                                                                                                           
1 Individuals may sort themselves into different sized firms for a variety of reasons. Appendix A explores
the distribution of workers across firm size and region in more detail.7
we there will be an increase in the number of individuals holding employer based
insurance.
III. Empirical Framework
If tax subsidies effect how health insurance is delivered in the market place then
we would expect that the largest effect will be on whether health insurance is offered
among smaller firms. In particular, if equation (3) describes the behavior of individuals in
who are employed in small firms, then we would expect that tax subsidies will entice
individuals to purchase insurance through a small firm employer instead of on the private
individual market, or even forgoing insurance all together.  On the other hand, if equation
(2) more accurately describes the behavior of individuals, that is it is optimal for them to
purchase insurance regardless of their employer’s size, then we would not expect the tax
subsidies to affect the decision to purchase insurance on the margin, although individuals
may purchase more insurance than would be optimal in the absence of the subsidies.  The
empirical strategy presented below tests whether the equation (2) or equation (3) better
describes observed behavior and attempts to assess the impact of tax subsidies on the
decision to purchase insurance through an employer.
The empirical work exploits the variation in tax subsidies across Canadian
provinces and American states. It examines differences in mean values of health
insurance coverage by firm size across provinces and states, and then extends the analysis
to a multivariate framework.
In Canada, it exploits unique tax laws in Quebec, which do not exclude employer
contributions to an employee’s health insurance from the employee’s taxable income.8
Therefore, employees in Quebec who have the same income and pay the same taxes as
similar employees in the rest of Canada receive a subsidy to their health insurance which
is considerably smaller (almost half the size) of that in other provinces. We would expect,
then, that if these subsidies alter the distribution of health insurance across firms of
different sizes, then this effect would be smaller in Quebec.
I use a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the effect of tax subsidies
to employer provided health insurance on firm size. I compare the distribution of health
insurance across large and small firms for provinces and states with varying tax-
subsidies.
In Canada  I compare the difference in supplemental health insurance in small and
large firms in Quebec with the distribution between firm sizes in other Canadian
provinces . The difference-in-differences estimator is then:
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where subscript O denotes other provinces, subscript L denotes large firms (defined as
five hundred or more employees), subscript Q denotes Quebec and subscript S denotes
small firms (defined as fewer than twenty employees
2).
In the United States I compare states with no state income taxes with those states
with the highest rates of income tax. The states with no income taxes are Alaska, Florida,
Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. The states with the highest
income taxes are California, Iowa, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon and the
District of Columbia. I use a difference-in-differences estimator identical to that
                                               
2 The definition of small firm is restricted by the categories available in the data sets. Therefore, small firms
are defined as less than twenty employees in the SWA data and less than 25 employees in the CPS data.9
described in equation (5), replacing the Canadian provinces with the states outlined
above.
The estimate,  $ d , represents the difference between small and large firms in the
high subsidy versus low subsidy environments in employer-provided health insurance
coverage. A negative value of  $ d  suggests that the differences in health insurance
coverage between large and small firms are greater in those states/provinces where
subsidies for insurance are smaller. I take this to mean that the states/provinces with
higher subsidies have higher levels of employer-provided health insurance coverage
across smaller firms, and, therefore, more employer based health insurance in general.
I extend the differences-in-differences estimator into a multivariate framework to
control for other factors which may influence the distribution of health insurance in
particular states/provinces. Differences in wages, occupations, industry composition, as
well as other demographic characteristics, may influence the distribution of health
insurance benefits. To control for these differences I estimate a probit model for the
probability of holding health insurance (hi):
(6)
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Where d, the coefficient on the interaction between being in a small firm in a low subsidy
region is the multivariate difference-in-differences estimator. X is a vector of
demographic characteristics including industry and union controls. w is the individual’s
after tax wage, region includes a vector of state or provincial dummy variables and small
firm is a dummy variable for being in a small firm. As a cutoff for the size of small firm I
use less than twenty employees in Canada and less than twenty-five in the U.S..10
The above empirical analysis exploits differences in subsidies between two
groups of provinces and states. However, there is considerable variation in the tax price
of insurance within the two groups I examine. To exploit this variation I create a variable
equal to the median price of insurance in each province and state. I then interact this
median tax price with firm size to examine the implications of differing subsidies by firm
size across provinces and states.
My analysis ignores a potentially important avenue for purchasing insurance:
through group association. An alternative form of pooling risks and reducing
administrative costs is to offer group insurance to individuals who belong to a common
organization or group. For example, many academics may be able to purchase insurance
through memberships with academic societies. These societies would then replace the
employer as a means of pooling risk and reducing costs
3. However, while offering these
advantages, such organizations can not offer subsidized health insurance by exempting
member contributions from the individual’s wage. Therefore, while we might expect that
some individuals choose to purchase health insurance through a non-employment related
group, we would expect that individuals would switch to employer-provided plans if the
tax subsidies were large enough such that it became economically superior for them to do
so. In this case, we can treat these individuals as private insurance holders when
examining the effects of tax subsidies on insurance in the workplace.
Non-Employer Provided Private Insurance
The model outlined above suggests that tax subsidies provide substantial
advantages to purchasing insurance through an employer. If we expect that more small11
firms will offer insurance as a result of higher tax subsidies, we might also expect that the
levels of private (non-employer provided) insurance will be higher in areas with low tax
subsidies. I test this hypothesis by comparing private (non-employer provided) health
insurance coverage levels in states with high tax subsidies to private health insurance
coverage in areas with smaller (no state level) tax subsidies. I first directly test the mean
levels of private coverage and then extend this analysis into a multivariate framework
similar to that outlined above.
  IV. Data
My empirical analysis draws on two data sources. The first is the 1995 Survey of
Work Arrangements (SWA). The SWA is a national cross-sectional survey conducted as
a supplement to the larger Canadian Labor Force Survey, a monthly survey of
employment and demographic data. The SWA sample contains information on
approximately 25,000 employed individuals. In addition to information on employment
status, the SWA provides detailed information about job characteristics for a subset of the
workers surveyed in the Labor Force Survey. The SWA asks a series of questions on non-
wage benefits, including supplemental health insurance and dental insurance. Benefit
questions were only asked of non-self-employed individuals. The SWA also includes
detailed information regarding the labor status and income of  spouses. After eliminating
self-employed individuals and individuals missing important information, the data set
consists of 15,688 observations. I impute marginal tax rates for individuals in the SWA
using tax information from the 1995 federal and provincial tax handbooks and from
                                                                                                                                           
3 I thank Mel Fuss for pointing this out.12
information contained in Tax Facts (KPMG, 1996). These imputed marginal tax rates
take into account the federal and provincial tax rates, federal and provincial surtaxes, and
standard deductions, including pension plan deductions, unemployment insurance
deductions, and deductions that might result from marital status and dependent children
(see Stabile, 1999) for details.
Table 3 shows the differences in tax rates by province. We can see that there is
considerable variation in the marginal tax rate, and hence the subsidy for employer based
health insurance, across provinces. In Quebec, where employer-provided health insurance
is not exempt from provincial income taxes,  the variation in the tax price of insurance is
considerably magnified.
The second data source is the 1995  March Current Population Surveys (CPS).  The
March CPS is a national survey of approximately fifty thousand households that includes
demographic and labor force information, as well as information on health insurance
coverage.  In each survey year the CPS asks whether or not the individual is covered by
Medicare, Medicaid or private health insurance.  Those with private coverage are asked
whether this coverage was made available through a current or former employer or
whether they purchased the coverage privately. I focus only on health insurance made
available through a current or former employer.  I keep only those individuals who are
working and exclude the self-employed unless I specifically note otherwise. I impute
federal and state income tax rates on wage and salary income only for the CPS sample
using information from federal tax forms and publications as well as the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1995). These tax rates are for a single
individual or a married individual filing separately. The rates account for deductions of13
federal taxes at the state level where appropriate.  The average price per dollar of
employer provided health insurance in those 7 states with the highest state taxes is $0.80.
In those states with no state taxes the average price per dollar of employer provided
health insurance is $0.73.
  V. Empirical Results
Difference-in-Differences:
To test whether tax subsidies affect the level of coverage in the workplace I
examine the differences in mean employer-provided supplemental health insurance
coverage between large and small firms in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. I examine
employer-provided coverage in firms with less than 20 people and compare them with
firms with more than 20 people. In Quebec, tax laws do not permit workers to exempt
employer contributions from their provincial income taxes; in the rest of Canada workers
can exempt contributions from provincial taxes. Therefore, the subsidy for a dollar of
health insurance is considerably smaller in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. While the
other provinces receive combined federal and provincial subsidies as high as 54 percent,
subsidies in Quebec are limited to a maximum of 31 percent. One would then expect,
given the model outlined above, that fewer smaller firms would offer insurance in
Quebec relative to larger firms. The difference-in-differences results confirm this
hypothesis. Table 4 presents these results. In large firms levels of coverage in Quebec
exceed those in the rest of Canada. In small firms levels of coverage in Quebec are
significantly lower than the rest of Canada. The gap in coverage levels between small
firms and large firms in Quebec is 7  percentage points larger than in the rest of Canada.14
That is, not only are individuals in small firms in Quebec less likely to get insurance than
individuals in large firms, but this difference is significantly larger than individuals in
similar sized firms in the rest of the country.
Table 5 presents similar difference-in-differences results for the United States.
Here I compare states with no state level income tax (and hence a smaller subsidy for
employer-provided health insurance) to states with the highest levels of state income tax
(and hence the largest subsidies for employer-provided health insurance). I choose the top
seven states ranked by top income tax bracket to match the seven states without state
level income tax. Again, a priori, we would expect that in individuals in smaller firms,
those with less than 25 employees, are less likely to have health insurance than
individuals in larger firms, those with 25 or more employees. Moreover, we expect that
this difference will be larger in those states with small tax subsidies for employer-
provided insurance. The data provide evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case. In
large firms levels of coverage to not differ between high tax and low tax states. In small
firms, levels of coverage are lower in low tax states. The gap in coverage levels between
large and small firms is 3 percentage points larger in those states with low tax subsidies
than in those states with high tax subsidies. This difference is significant at the 5% level.
Multivariate Results:
 I extend this analysis into the multivariate framework outlined above by fitting a
probit regression to the SWA and CPS data. The multivariate analysis allows me to
control for other variation, which may influence the probability of holding employer-15
provided health insurance.  The results from the Canadian SWA data are presented in
column 1 of Table 6. The multivariate results confirm the results above. Coverage levels
for individuals in small firms versus large firms in Quebec are 7.5 percentage points
lower than in the rest of Canada. Again, this reflects the difference between small and
large firms in Quebec as compared to the difference between firms of similar sizes in the
rest of the country.
Other explanatory variables have their expected effects on the probability of
holding health insurance. The tax-price of a dollar of insurance has a negative and
significant effect (see Stabile, 1999 for a full discussion of the impact of the tax-price on
the decision to offer insurance). After-tax wages have a positive and significant effect on
the decision to hold insurance. Individuals who work more hours, are members of a
union, have longer tenures with their employers, and in larger firms are all more likely to
have health insurance. Industry and occupation dummies are included. A chi-squared test
for the joint significance of these dummy variables suggests that both sets are jointly
significant variables in determining whether an individual holds supplemental health
insurance through an employer.
One concern with examining employer-sponsored coverage in small firms is that
some workers in small firms may have insurance coverage from other sources. In
particular, workers who have coverage through a spouse’s employer may choose to work
in a firm without insurance to earn a higher wage. To try and test whether this type of
behavior is driving the results reported above, I repeat the above analysis limiting my
sample to non-married individuals. The results from this analysis are not presented here,
but are almost identical (similar magnitude and significance) to the results obtained from16
using the entire sample. This suggest that while joint maximization of benefits between
spouses may be occurring, it is not driving the results presented above.
The second column of Table 6 exploits differences in the tax subsidies across all
ten provinces instead of simply contrasting Quebec and the rest of Canada. I use the
median tax subsidy in each province and interact this subsidy with a dummy variable for
being in a small firm. The resulting coefficient is then a measure of how different
provincial tax subsidies alter the probability of holding health insurance in small firms
across all provinces. I find that the individuals in small firms are less likely to hold health
insurance in provinces with lower tax subsidies.
I estimate similar equations using CPS data for the U.S. population (Table 7).
Once again the multivariate analysis confirms, and even bolsters, the difference-in-
differences results presented above. Coverage levels for individuals in a small firm in low
subsidy states, relative to large firms, are 5 percentage points lower than coverage levels
for individuals in states with higher subsidies. This result is strongly significant and
slightly larger than the difference-in-differences result above. Other explanatory variables
have similar effects to those in the Canadian data. The tax-price of health insurance has a
negative and very significant effect on the probability of having health insurance. Wages
are positively correlated with holding employer-provided health insurance, as is being a
member of a union. Age is positively correlated with having health insurance whereas it
is negatively correlated in the SWA data. The reason for this is that the SWA data has
information on tenure with the current employer. Without the tenure information, the
coefficients on age are similar in both data sets. Including tenure removes the positive
correlation between age and health insurance suggesting that age is a proxy for tenure.17
Once again, industry dummy variables are included, although not reported in Table 7.
The second column of table 7 uses median tax subsidies by state instead of the
dichotomous high subsidy state, low subsidy state distinction. Again I find that
individuals in small firms are less likely to have insurance in states with low subsidies
than in states with higher subsidies
4.
In sum, the difference-in-differences analysis and the multivariate analysis in both
Canada and the United States present consistent evidence that the tax-subsidies to
employer-provided health insurance results in greater insurance coverage among
individuals in smaller firms. This evidence supports the hypothesis outlined in equations
(3) and (3’) above which suggest that the tax-subsidies reduce the costs of insurance such
that it is now profitable for individuals to purchase insurance regardless of the size of
their employer. Therefore, the primary mechanism by which tax subsidies affect the
margin of whether or not to buy any insurance through an employer is by promoting such
insurance in small firms.
Non-Employer-Provided Health Insurance
The evidence above suggests that offering greater subsidies to health insurance
may influence individuals in small firms to obtain coverage through an employer.  In
regions where tax subsidies are low, therefore, there is little incentive to purchase
insurance through a small sized employer, and we might expect that individuals whose
                                               
4 As with the Canadian data, I repeat this analysis using single individuals only to check whether
individuals with spousal coverage who work in small firms without coverage may be driving the results
above. Once again, the results using non-married individuals only are of similar magnitude and significance
to those presented above.18
indirect utility from purchasing insurance is greater than not purchasing insurance will
obtain coverage through the private (non-employer-provided) market. An initial
examination of the CPS data suggest that this is indeed the case. Individuals in states with
no state taxes (and hence lower subsidies for employer-provided health insurance) are
approximately 16 percent more likely to hold private health insurance (1 percentage
point). This difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
I use a difference-in-differences estimator to examine whether the difference in
private (non-employer provided) insurance rates between employees of small and large
firms is greater in low tax states than in high tax states. I examine the difference between
employees in small and larger firms because we should expect that larger firms can offer
insurance well below the private market rate and as a result, employees of large firms
who want health insurance would be very unlikely to purchase such insurance on the
private market. Table 8 presents the difference-in-differences  results. We see that in all
firms with greater than 25 employees rates of private coverage among employees are
identical. However, in small firms rates of private coverage among employees are
approximately 2 percentage points higher in low tax (low subsidy) states than in high tax
states. The difference-in-differences is approximately 2 percentage points and is
significant.
I extend this into a multivariate regression framework by fitting a linear
probability model to holding private health insurance outside the workplace
5. I examine a
model which simply includes a dummy variables for being in a low subsidy area and then
extend this model to a difference-in-differences framework, interacting low subsidy areas19
with being employed in a small firm.. Table 9 presents the results. The first column of
Table 9 looks at whether being in a low tax state increases the probability that an
individual holds private coverage outside the workplace. Being in a low tax state
increases the probability of holding private coverage by approximately half a percentage
point, although, unlike the analysis of straight means presented above, the multivariate
analysis is not significant at the 10 percent level. The second column of Table 9
reproduces the difference-in-differences analysis in a multivariate framework. Similar to
the straight difference-in-differences result, the gap in private, non-employer provided,
insurance coverage between workers in large and small firms is 1.5 percentage points
greater in low subsidy states than in high subsidy states, and this difference is significant
at the 10 percent level. This is consistent with the hypothesis that tax subsidies encourage
individuals to buy insurance through an employer. As the tax price of insurance comes
closer to the price of insurance on the private market (one dollar) individuals are more
likely to simply hold insurance purchased on the private market, instead of through an
employer. Similarly, working in a small firm has a positive effect on holding private
insurance outside an employment relationship. Relative to being in a small firm, each of
the firm size dummies are negative and significant, suggesting that levels of private
coverage decrease dramatically as firm size of employment increases.
These results suggest that tax subsidies may have a small impact on the
propensity to hold private insurance outside the workplace, with individuals who face
                                                                                                                                           
5 I use linear probability models instead of probit models for the estimation because a very small percentage
of the population has private insurance provided outside an employment relationship (4%) and the linear
probability model does a much better job of returning the differences in means.20
larger subsidies more likely to purchase insurance through and employer and less likely
to purchase through the private market
6.
Implications
I can use my estimates of how the tax subsidies affect coverage levels across firm
sizes and between the employment and private market to examine how the subsidies have
changed the distribution of health insurance coverage in the United States in order to
examine the implications of removing the subsidies on health insurance coverage across
firms and in the private market.
 I can extrapolate how removing the subsidies would affect the gap in insurance
coverage and the level of private, non-employer provided coverage, using the differences
observed in data between low tax and high tax states. I assume that the level of coverage
in large firms will not be affected by removing the subsidy
7 (although we would expect
that the amount of insurance purchased would decrease as the marginal cost of an
additional dollar increases by an average of $0.24). The removal of the subsidies would
result in decreases in coverage in small firms and perhaps increases in coverage on the
private market. Using an average gap in coverage between large and small firms of 35
                                               
6 If individuals do not value health benefits, they may choose to work in a firm which does not offer
benefits, or alternatively, they may choose to be self-employed. If avoiding health insurance costs were a
primary motive for choosing self-employment we would expect that levels of private coverage (obtained
outside the employment relationship) would be quite low among such workers. However, data from the
CPS suggests otherwise. If we examine all workers without employer provided health coverage, self-
employed workers are much more likely to purchase private coverage, all else equal, than are not self-
employed workers without employer coverage. This suggest that avoiding paying for health insurance is
not causing people to select themselves into self employment. Research by Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen
[1994] suggest that lack of health insurance coverage has had no noticeable effect on the movement of
workers into self-employment, providing further evidence that health insurance coverage, or lack thereof,
does not have a sizeable impact on the decision to be self-employed.21
percentage points in the U.S. and an average tax-price of insurance of 0.76 in the U.S.,
my estimates suggest that removing the subsidy to employer provided health insurance
completely would cause coverage levels in small firms to decrease by approximately 50
percent, increasing the gap between small and large firms to approximately 51 percentage
points. The level of employer-provided health insurance coverage in small firms would
then fall from its current level (1995 data) of 32% to 16% (see table 10). This decline
would be partially offset by increasing in coverage in the private market. Extrapolating
from the differences in private insurance coverage between states with high and low
subsidies, removing the subsidies all together would cause an increase in private
insurance coverage among workers in small firms from 9 percent to 14 percent (table 10).
Therefore, by removing the subsidies for employer provided health insurance we
would see large changes in both the number of insured and the method by which people
obtain health insurance. Workers in large firms would continue to purchase insurance
through an employer because of the benefits other than the tax subsidies of doing so.
Among the smallest firms, levels of coverage would drop dramatically because without
the subsidy there is little to no advantage from buying insurance through an employer.
Part of this drop would be offset by people buying health insurance on the private market.
Presumably, part of the drop would result in a rise in the number of insured. It is difficult
to accurately measure how the number of insured would change with such a policy
change as other options for insurance, namely coverage as a dependent, would
presumably be a potential substitute, along with private coverage,  for coverage under
one’s own employer.
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  VI. Conclusions
Tax subsidies to employer provided health insurance lower the costs of providing
health insurance through an employer, regardless of the size of the firm. Unlike the other
advantages of employer-provided health insurance, the tax-subsidies are determined by
the individual employee’s characteristics, namely his or her marginal tax rate. While
smaller firms are still much less likely to offer insurance than larger firms, the subsidies
may make insurance more attractive to workers in a small firm than purchasing insurance
outside the workplace, or not purchasing insurance at all. Subsidies are unlikely to have
any observable affect on coverage levels in large firms because of advantages large firms
offer in the administration of insurance. The findings reported above confirm this
hypothesis. Data from both the United States and Canada support the claim that the
insurance coverage gap between small and large firms is smaller in those states or
provinces which have higher tax subsidies. The gap is due to differences in coverage
levels across small firms. Levels in large firms do not differ significantly according the to
the value of the subsidy. These findings are significant and consistent across several
specifications. Furthermore, there is some evidence that rates of private coverage
obtained outside any employment relationship are higher in those states with lower tax
subsidies. Subsidies to employer-provided health insurance, therefore, have an observable
affect on the marginal decision to hold insurance in smaller sized firms, thereby reducing
the level of private, non-employer provided insurance. The subsidies thereby help to
promote the link between employment and health insurance coverage, particularly among
smaller firms.23
 My findings suggest that removing the subsidies to employer-provided health
insurance will have a significant effect on the level of employer-provided health
insurance coverage in small firms. Removing the subsidies all together would cause the
level of coverage in small firms to fall by 50%. On the other hand, coverage levels in
large firms are unlikely to change by very much with the removal of the subsidies.  Small
gains in private, non-employer provided insurance, would offset only a fraction of this
decline.24
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Table 1 Percentage of Workers with Employer Provided Health Insurance by Firm
Size in Canada
# of Employees Canada Quebec Canada excluding Quebec
< 20 21.4 18.8 22.3
20-99 54.1 52.4 54.7
100-500 68.1 76.1 65.4
500+ 75.8 79.4 74.7
Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements
Weighted tabulations using SWA final weights.
Table 2 Percentage of Workers with Employer Provided Health Insurance by Firm
Size in the United States
# of Employees All States States with No Income Tax States with Income Tax
<10 30.1 26.5 30.9
11-25 40.8 35.5 41.8
25-99 57.4 55.3 57.8
100-499 67.6 62.1 68.4
500-999 71.8 70.8 71.9
1000+ 72.6 71.5 72.9
Source: 1995 Current Population Survey
Weighted tabulations using CPS March supplemental weights.28













Newfoundland 30.4 0.026 29.1 0.71
P.E.I. 28.4 0.019 27.6 0.72
Nova Scotia 27.1 0.022 27.6 0.72
New Brunswick 29.6 0.020 28.4 0.72
Quebec 35.1 0.008 38.2 0.82
Ontario 32.3 0.021 41.8 0.58
Manitoba 31.3 0.021 28.4 0.72
Saskatchewan 29.6 0.021 28.9 0.71
Alberta 28.0 0.018 25.8 0.74
British
Columbia
31.3 0.020 40.3 0.60
1. Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements. Marginal tax rates are calculated by
author.29
Table 4 Difference-in-Differences: Employer-Provided Health Insurance Coverage




Rest of Canada 0.677 0.224 -0.453
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Quebec 0.712 0.187 -0.525
(0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Difference 0.036 -0.037 -0.072
(0.010) (0.017) (0.020)
1.  Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements
2.  Standard Errors in Parentheses
3.  Small firms are defined as <20 employees.
4.  Difference-in-Differences is displayed in the bottom right corner.
Table 5 Difference-in-Differences: Employer-Provided Health Insurance Coverage
in  States with no state tax versus states with highest state tax
Other Sized Firms Small Firms Difference
High Tax States 0.668 0.329 -0.338
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Low Tax States 0.667 0.298 -0.369
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Difference 0.000 -0.031 -0.030
(0.008) (0.012) (0.014)
1. Source: 1995 CPS
2. Standard Errors in Parentheses
3. Small firms are defined as <25 employees.
4. Difference-in-Differences is displayed in the bottom right corner.30
Table 6 The Effect of Health Insurance Subsidies on the Probability of Health





Small firm* Quebec (column 1), Small firm*











Number of children -0.0091* -0.0091*
(0.0048) (0.0048)






Spouse employed -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.016) (0.016)
Tenure with Current Employer 0.088** 0.089**
(0.0040) (0.0040)
Senior member present in household -0.019 -0.019
(0.020) (0.020)
Spouse’s age -0.018** -0.018**
(0.0033) (0.0033)
Firm size 20-99 0.241** -0.379*
(0.017) (0.224)
Firm size 100-500 0.307** -0.313
(0.017) (0.224)






Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements
1.  Standard Errors in parentheses.
2.  Includes occupational dummies, industry dummies and provincial dummies.
3.    Coefficients presented as marginal effects.31
Table 7 The Effect of Health Insurance Subsidies on the Probability of Health





Small firm* low subsidy state (column 1), Small
firm * Median state tax price (column 2)
-0.053** -0.490**
(0.017) (0.206)














Firm Size 10-24 0.112** 0.112**
(0.015) (0.015)
Firm Size 25-99 0.193** -0.180
(0.016) (0.167)
Firm Size 100-499 0.269** -0.104
(0.016) (0.167)
Firm Size 500-999 0.337** -0.036
(0.021) (0.167)







1. Standard Errors in parentheses.
2. Includes State and Industry dummies. Only the 14 states representing the high and low tax states are
included in the model.
3. Coefficients presented as marginal effects.32
Table 8  Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Private (Non-Employer Provided)
Insurance
Large Firms Small Firms Difference
High Tax States 0.026 0.081 0.055
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Low Tax States 0.026 0.099 0.073
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Difference 0.000 0.018 0.018
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Source: 1995 CPS
1.  Standard Errors in Parentheses
2.  Difference-in-difference estimate in lower right corner
3.  Small firms are defined as <25 employees.33





Small firm* low subsidy state --- 0.014*
--- (0.0081)
Low Tax State 0.0051 ---
(0.0033) ---














Firm Size <10 0.079** 0.070**
(0.0060) (0.0068)
Firm Size 10-24 0.040** 0.032**
(0.0058) (0.0067)
Firm Size 25-99 0.018** 0.015**
(0.0041) (0.0042)
Firm Size 100-499 0.0062* 0.0040
(0.0035) (0.0035)







1. Standard Errors in parentheses.
2. Includes Industry dummies. Only the 14 states representing the high and low tax states are included in
the model. Column 2 includes state dummies.
3. Coefficients presented as marginal effects.34
Table 10
With Subsidies: Health Insurance by Firm Size




Small Firms (<25) 32 9
Larger Firms (>25) 67 3
Source: 1995 CPS
Without Subsidies: Health Insurance by Firm Size




Small Firms (<25) 16 14
Larger Firms (>25) 67 3
Source: 1995 CPS35
APPENDIX A: Further Analysis on the Distribution of Workers Across
Firms
The nature of employer-provided health insurance is that it is provided through
the labor market. Since the market in question is for labor, and not health insurance,
potential workers do not always have a choice of whether they can obtain health
insurance at a given firm. In many cases, although certainly not all, the worker may have
to choose a combination of wages and health insurance by choosing between firms which
offer differing employment packages. A firm will offer an employment package in an
attempt to attract the marginal or median employee (depending on whether the firm is
unionized or not). In this case, workers will sort themselves into firms based on the
combination of wages and benefits which provide the individual with the highest utility.
One concern about such sorting in the labor market is that individuals may sort
themselves differently in different provinces or for reasons apart from the tax-subsidies
for employer-provided health insurance. In this case, differences in health insurance
coverage among people with differing tax subsidies, or across different size firms may be
due to labor market sorting factors apart from health insurance coverage. While we can
not completely determine why individuals sort themselves the way they do, the evidence
provided in the chapters 2 and 3 suggests a story consistent with individuals responding
to tax advantages for employer-provided insurance.
A second concern is that individuals take the best available job and that the “good
jobs” come with health insurance, as well as other benefit packages, and the bad jobs do
not. Therefore, the worker is not really making a choice regarding employer provided
health insurance. There is recent evidence that suggests that this is not the case. The most36
recent figures suggest that while the number of jobs offering health insurance has
increased between 1987 and 1996, take-up rates (the number of workers accepting this
offer of insurance) have declined [Cooper and Schone, 1997]. 1997 data shows that while
71.7 percent of all workers were employed in a firm that offered health insurance, 85.4
percent of these workers accepted coverage. Of the workers who turned down coverage,
22 percent went uninsured (no coverage from any other source) [Thorpe and Florence,
1999].
I have shown that health insurance is much more common in large firms, and
among higher income individuals. Below I present an analysis of the differences in the
distribution of workers across provinces to address concerns that the sorting mechanism
used by individuals differs systemically by province. Table A1 below shows the
distribution of health insurance benefits by firm size for each of the ten provinces. In all
provinces the probability of holding insurance is greater in larger firms than in smaller
firms, although as noted in chapter 3, Quebec has the largest difference in insurance
coverage between the smallest and largest firms, consistent with the hypothesis presented
in this chapter that the lower subsidies make it less attractive for smaller firms to offer
health insurance coverage relative to larger firms.
Table A2 shows the distribution of workers with incomes greater than the median
income across different size firms in all provinces. We might be concerned if, in Quebec,
there was a larger portion of workers with incomes above the median income in small
firms where the probability of health insurance is much lower. If this were the case we
would see fewer workers with relatively high marginal tax rates (and hence high
subsidies for employer-provided insurance) actually taking up coverage. However, this37
does not appear to be the case. On average, 12 percent of workers in with incomes above
the median income are in small firms. In Quebec, 10 percent of such workers are in small
firms. In Ontario, the corresponding number is 11 percent. Quebec has 50 percent of
workers with incomes about the median working in the largest firms. This is higher than
provinces such as Alberta or British Columbia, but lower than Ontario.
Tables A3 and A4 examine hourly wages across firms and provinces/states. Table
A3 presents a difference-in-differences estimate of the wage gap between the smallest
and largest firms in Quebec versus the rest of Canada. The gap is significantly larger in
Quebec than it is in the rest of Canada. However, this is not the case in the United States
(Table A4). The gap between large and small firms in states with no income tax is
actually smaller than it is in states with income taxes although this difference is not
significant at the 10% level. Given that the hypothesis that small firms are more likely to
offer insurance in high tax states than in low tax states holds for both Canadian and U.S.
data, it does not appear to be the case that the difference in wage differentials for Quebec
and the rest of Canada is driving this result.
Table A1 Percentage of Workers With Health Insurance by Firm Size and Province
Province/Firm Size Less than 20 20 to 99 100 to 500 More than 500
Newfoundland 19.9 60.9 86.1 74.5
PEI 23.5 56.3 73.7 71.6
Nova Scotia 29.8 60.7 61.4 72.3
New Brunswick 23.2 45.2 61.0 72.1
Quebec 18.8 52.4 76.1 79.4
Ontario 22.2 58.0 67.7 77.6
Manitoba 25.8 55.2 58.3 73.6
Saskatchewan 19.3 43.7 57.8 58.7
Alberta 18.0 50.9 56.2 69.6
British Columbia 24.0 51.7 69.3 73.5
Total 21.4 54.1 68.1 75.8
1. Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements38
Table A2 Percentage of Workers with Incomes greater than the Median Income by
Firm Size and Province
Province/Firm Size Less than 20 20 to 99 100 to 500 More than 500
Newfoundland 13 8 24 55
PEI 16 16 22 47
Nova Scotia 12 13 16 59
New Brunswick 14 11 21 54
Quebec 10 15 24 50
Ontario 11 11 19 58
Manitoba 8 12 21 59
Saskatchewan 14 15 24 47
Alberta 15 15 22 48
British Columbia 14 18 20 48
Total 12 13 21 54
1. Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements39
Table A3 Difference-in-Differences: Hourly Wages by Firm Size, by Province in
Canada









Quebec 17.889 10.571 -7.318
(0.221) (0.181) (0.286)
Difference 1.104 -0.509 -1.613
(0.242) (0.212) (0.322)
1. Source: 1995 Survey of Work Arrangements
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A4 Difference-in-Differences: Hourly Wages by Firm Size, by State, in the
U.S.
Large Firms (500+) Small Firms (<25) Difference
States with Tax 14.691 11.011 -3.680
(0.094) (0.128) (0.159)
No Tax States 13.674 10.600 -3.074
(0.463) (0.289) (0.546)
Difference -1.017 -0.411 0.606
(0.472) (0.317) (0.568)
1.  Source: 1995 Current Population Survey
2.  Standard errors in parentheses.